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ABSTRACT 
 
FDI and Wages: Evidence from Firm-Level and Linked 
Employer-Employee Data in Hungary, 1986-20081 
 
We estimate the wage effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) with universal firm-level and 
linked employer-employee panel data containing 4,926 foreign acquisitions in Hungary. 
Matching on pre-acquisition data and controlling for fixed effects for firms and detailed worker 
groups, we find 12-28 percent effects on average wages. The wage effect mostly reverses for 
983 foreign acquisitions later divested to domestic owners. We find positive effects for all 
worker types, occupations, and wage quantiles. The evidence implies little role for either 
measurement problems or residual selection, but suggests a strong cross-firm association of 
FDI wage premia with similar differentials in productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
The possibility of substantial “employer effects” in wage determination suggests that firms 
play a role beyond passively conveying market forces of demand and supply.  Research 
documenting employer effects using linked employer-employee data (e.g., Groshen 1991; Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Hellerstein and Neumark 1999) thus opens up a number of 
interesting questions:  What characteristics of firms are associated with high and low wages?  Are 
the effects of these characteristics neutral across workers, or do they reflect winners and losers 
across different groups of employees?  What factors explain the observed wage differences across 
firms – are they due to measurement artifacts, selection bias, unmeasured heterogeneity, or do they 
represent genuine differences in economic behavior? 
We address these questions in this paper focusing on a firm characteristic that has been the 
subject of controversy in the context of both policy and research:  foreign versus domestic 
ownership.  Analysis of foreign controlling ownership (foreign direct investment or FDI), has 
consistently documented a positive average wage premium in the raw data (e.g., Lipsey 2002; 
Moran 2011).  However, a crucial question is whether FDI may be selective, “cream-skimming” or 
“cherry-picking” the best domestic firms for acquisition and the best areas and industries for 
greenfield start-ups. Studies at the firm-level have sometimes addressed this problem using 
matching methods or fixed effects, usually finding a significant wage gap in favor of foreign 
ownership even after these adjustments.
2
   However, the firm-level data typically contain no 
information on individual worker wages and characteristics, thus making it impossible to control 
for employee composition or to estimate wage effects for different types of workers.  Studies of 
worker-level data with information on employer ownership can address these latter issues, but they 
generally contain little information on firm characteristics and for their selection into ownership 
types.  The advantages of both types of data can in principle be combined with linked employer-
employee data (LEED), and the results from recent LEED studies have been mixed, sometimes 
implying that the causal effect of foreign ownership is small or non-existent.
3
  A general problem 
in this literature is that many databases contain few foreign acquisitions or a short time series for 
analysis, and analysis of worker heterogeneity is frequently limited to only two skill groups.   
This paper builds on this research in a number of ways. We estimate the impact of foreign 
acquisitions on wages in Hungary, an economy that rapidly liberalized inward investment during 
the 1990s.  The Hungarian case provides not only large numbers of acquisitions across most 
sectors of the economy, but also firm-level data and LEED that are particularly suitable for 
estimation.  The firm-level data we study have the advantage of complete coverage and detailed 
financial information over a 23-year long panel (1986-2008); they include 4926 foreign 
acquisitions with information prior to and after acquisition, usually several years of each.  The 
LEED are less comprehensive, based on a random sample of personnel records for about 7 percent 
of all Hungarian business sector employees, but they permit us to analyze the variation in wages 
among workers and to control for their characteristics, so that the (observable) composition of 
employment is held constant.  The LEED contain fewer foreign acquisitions with both pre- and 
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post-acquisition data – 644 – but more than in most previous research, and they contain 2.5 million 
worker-year observations within the linked firms.  Individual variables include wages, schooling, 
age, gender, occupation, and a dummy for recent hire.  While the worker-level data do not contain 
a unique identifier, the available characteristics are detailed enough to enable us to follow most 
workers remaining with the same employer, and to estimate separation and hiring rates.  
Our empirical strategies tap the richness and size of these data in several ways.  Excluding 
greenfield FDI, we focus on acquisitions for which the pre- and post-acquisition information may 
help identify a foreign effect. Throughout, we exploit the full longitudinal structure of the data, 
rather than selecting arbitrary pre- and post-acquisition years.  Following evaluation methods 
originally designed for training programs (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998; Blundell and 
Costa Dias 2000), we use detailed financial and wage history over multiple years prior to 
acquisition to construct control groups of non-acquired firms.  By contrast, most previous studies 
of FDI and wages are restricted by available data to coarser-grained matching based on 
information only from the year of acquisition or the year just before.
4
  We combine matching with 
regression including firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant heterogeneity across firms.  In 
some specifications, we include fixed effects for worker-types within firms, defined by interactions 
of gender, educational category, years of experience, and county.  In others, we include worker-
firm fixed effects, in order to identify the impact on wages of incumbents at the time of takeover. 
Using these methods, we find consistent evidence of a positive impact of foreign 
acquisitions.  In our preferred specifications the estimates lie in the range of 12 to 27 percent. They 
are smaller than both the raw foreign premium and the premium implied by simple OLS 
regressions, which are 45-60 percent in the full data and 30-45 percent in the matched sample, 
based on a Ñopo (2008) decomposition, which suggests that acquired firms are positively selected 
on the factors for which our methods control.  On the other hand, the magnitudes of the estimated 
FDI effects are similar to or greater than typical estimates reported for the regression-adjusted 
wage differentials associated with unionism, firm size, gender, race, and job displacement.  
In an extension of this identification approach, we take advantage of 983 observations on 
Hungarian firms acquired by foreign investors but later re-divested into domestic Hungarian hands.  
Using these “treatment reversals,” we examine the extent to which the estimated acquisition and 
divestment effects are symmetric – similar in magnitude but opposite in sign.  While rejecting 
symmetry does not necessarily invalidate a causal interpretation of the estimated acquisition effect, 
a finding of no reversal would imply that the acquisition effects we have estimated are either 
coincidental or for some reason tend to persist even after the foreign owners have departed.  Our 
symmetry test is particularly strong as it involves ownership switches within the same firm where 
we can control for firm and worker group fixed effects, thus removing any time-invariant, 
unobservable differences in firm and worker-group characteristics between acquisitions and 
divestments.  The results from this analysis show, especially in the matched sample, that 
divestment largely reverses the acquisition effect.  This “treatment reversal” result suggests that 
the foreign wage premium reflects distinctive actions or characteristics of the foreign owners, 
rather than the acquisition process or the nature of the target. 
Do these positive average wage effects from foreign acquisition mask differences in the 
outcomes experienced by different types of workers, so that there may be “winners” and “losers” 
or different levels of “winning”?  Most previous research distinguishes only two types of worker 
(“high” and “low” skill, frequently identified with   Defining worker groups by characteristics 
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between 100 and 300.  Studies with more switchers usually have few observations per firm before and after the switch. 
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according to gender, experience, education, recent hire, occupation, and wage quantile, our results 
imply that FDI raises wages for all groups.  Even incumbent workers are estimated to realize a 
significant wage gain, although smaller than our estimate for post-acquisition hires.  Higher skilled 
workers (university-educated, high-skilled occupations, and higher wage quantile) realize larger 
gains, but the differences are not great, and surprisingly (at least to us), we are unable to identify 
any groups suffering systematic wage losses following foreign acquisition. 
To the extent the data permit, we consider residual selection and measurement issues as 
possible explanations for the foreign wage premium.  We find only very slight differences between 
acquired and domestic firms in worker separation and hiring rates, in firm survival rates, and in 
employment changes after acquisition.  Moreover, the data generally show only small effects on 
worker composition in acquired firms, although we do observe a substantial rise in university 
educated employees.  Concerning measurement problems, we analyze limited information on 
hours worked, possible under-reporting of wages, and fringe benefits to assess their potential roles 
in accounting for the estimated foreign effects. 
Genuine foreign effects on wages may be explained by a variety of theoretical mechanisms, 
including shared gains from innovation or restructuring leading to improved firm performance, 
compensating differentials possibly associated with higher effort, and efficiency wages to reduce 
worker turnover or shirking.  While our purpose is not to distinguish their separate contributions 
(although we offer some speculations based on the patterns in our results), a common theme in 
these mechanisms is that the wage gains from foreign acquisition should be associated with 
productivity improvements.  We therefore also estimate productivity effects, which we find tend to 
be slightly larger than the size of the estimated wage effects, consistent with an interpretation that 
FDI yields productivity gains shared between the owners and workers.  Moreover, we find a strong 
positive correlation across firms in the size of the productivity and wage effects in acquired firms 
relative to their controls, suggesting that the wage relationship is part of a genuine change in firm 
behavior and not purely an artifact of selection bias. 
Further delving into the productivity relationship, we study heterogeneity in the wage and 
productivity effects of FDI across types of acquisition target, source country, and time period.  We 
find higher wage and productivity effects when the target is state-owned, presumably because of 
greater possibilities for restructuring, although we also find a significant effect for private targets.  
Using information available a sub-sample with source country information, we find a higher effect 
when the source country is relatively well-developed, defined as a larger GDP per capita compared 
to Hungary.  These results suggest that the wage effects of FDI tend to rise with the potential for 
productivity improvement.  On the other hand, when we permit the effects to vary by time periods, 
we find similar FDI effects for both wages and productivity despite Hungary’s development during 
the post-socialist transition. 
The next section describes the construction of our database, the evolution of FDI in 
Hungary, wages, and other variables. Section 3 describes the estimation procedures, Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. 
2. Data and Context 
Data Sources and Samples 
Appendix B to this paper contains a full description of the data, which we summarize only 
briefly here.  The main source of our firm-level panel is the National Tax Administration (TA) of 
Hungary.  These data are available annually from 1992 to 2008 for all firms engaged in double-
entry bookkeeping, and from 1986 to 1991 for a large sample (based on inclusion in the Wage 
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Survey, described below).  The data thus span a long period from well before the transition started 
until several years after the country’s accession to the European Union.  The TA files include the 
balance sheet and income statement, the proportion of share capital held by different types of 
owners, and basic variables such as employment, location, and industry.  In addition, for a sub-
sample of these firms, we use data from the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and 
Justice to identify the country of origin of foreign investors in order to examine differences in the 
wage effect of FDI associated with differences in the source country’s level of development. 
The source of our worker-level data is the Hungarian Wage Survey (WS), which contains 
personnel information for a large probability sample of workers in 1986 and 1989 and for each 
year from 1992 to 2008. The sampling for this survey is complex and has changed somewhat over 
the years, as further described in the Web Appendix B.  In 1986 and 1989, workers were randomly 
selected within occupational-earnings groups in each firm.  Since 1992, workers are included 
according to birthday (2 days of each month for production workers, 3 days of each month for 
nonproduction workers), a procedure that results in a random sample of about 6.6 percent of 
production workers, and 10 percent of non-production workers.  To account for these different 
probabilities, as well as the probability of firm inclusion (which increases in firm size) we 
construct weights to adjust the sample to the total number of employees in the Hungarian 
economy.  Variables in the WS data include earnings, highest level of education, gender, age, 
occupation, whether the worker is a new hire, and working hours in some years.   
Linking the WS with the TA firm-level data creates a linked employer-employee dataset 
(LEED) in which we are able to follow firms through a consistent firm identifier.  Workers do not 
have unique identifiers and thus cannot be readily followed over time, but relying on individual 
characteristics and on the sampling scheme based on birthdays (which of course are time-
invariant), we are able to link many of the employees who remain in the same workplace from one 
year to the next. Using information on these workers, who account for 37 percent of all 
observations and 64 percent of those which have at least two consecutive firm-year observations, 
we can estimate separate foreign ownership effects for incumbent workers remaining with the firm 
for at least one observation point post-acquisition and we can control for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity among these incumbents.  The regressions are weighted with the probability of 
inclusion in the linked worker sample. 
The estimation samples exclude firms in education, health care, and two-digit industries 
where no foreign acquisitions took place (15,560 cases in the firm level data with NACE Rev 1.1 
codes 12, 13, 42, 75, 80, 85, 91, 95, 99) and those with more than two changes in majority 
ownership (792 cases in the firm-level data).  In the LEED, we restrict attention to full-time 
employees only between the age of 15 and 74.  After further minor decreases due to missing 
values, the resulting firm-level sample comprises 1.9 million firm-year observations on 377 
thousand unique firms, of which 33 thousand are linked to employee information resulting in a 
LEED of 2.5 million worker-years.  Appendix tables B1a and B1b provide detailed information on 
the number of non-missing observations per year and on the aggregation of sample weights to 
show the magnitude of total employment that our sample represents. 
 
FDI in Hungary  
In 1986, the first year in our sample, Hungary’s economy was centrally planned and 
foreign ownership was prohibited.  Some slight changes to corporate control began with gradual 
decentralization and increased autonomy for state-owned enterprises in the late 1980s (Szakadát, 
1993), but the first foreign acquisition took place only in 1989.  In the early 1990s, the freely 
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elected governments liberalized constraints on foreign investment and provided tax and other 
preferences for foreign investors (OECD 2000).  By the mid-1990s, Hungary had the highest value 
of FDI per capita among all post-socialist countries (World Bank 2002).  The high pace of FDI 
continued throughout our sample period, as EU accession became increasingly assured and was 
finally attained in 2004. 
Using a majority foreign ownership threshold for classification as FDI acquisition, the 
evolution of the number and employment of foreign acquired firms in the firm-level and LEED 
samples is presented in Figure 1.
5
  Expressed as a share of the total number of domestic firms plus 
firms that have been acquired by foreign investors, the percentage is zero in the 1980s, and it rises 
during the 1990s to about 3 percent in the firm-level data and to about 7 percent in the LEED of all 
firms.  The share of foreign acquired firms in employment rises to around 15 percent in both data 
sets – reflecting a larger relative size both of firms in the LEED and of firms acquired through FDI. 
This rapid influx of FDI provides large numbers of observations with information both 
before and after acquisition that we use to help identify FDI effects.  As shown in Table 1, Panel 
A, the full data contain 4,926 foreign acquisitions, many more than those available in previous 
studies of FDI and wages.  In the LEED the number of ownership switches is much smaller – 644 
– but still larger than in most of studies in this area.  The time series before and after acquisition 
are also long in both datasets:  the average of 9-10 years is much longer than in previous studies 
(acquisitions by year are shown in Appendix Table B2a, and details of the numbers of observations 
providing identifying variation are shown in Tables B2b and B2c). 
Most of these acquisitions are “single,” meaning that a domestic firm simply becomes 
foreign-owned and does not change ownership status again.  However, many are “reversals” that 
start domestic, are then acquired by foreign investors, and then are subsequently divested by the 
foreign owners so that they become domestically owned again.  These firms are especially useful 
in an extension of our identification strategy, discussed in the next section.  There are 983 and 86 
such firms in the firm and the linked data, respectively.  These firms also have long time series, 
typically observed for 11-12 years divided roughly equally between their 3 periods of domestic-
foreign-domestic. 
Table 1 also contains, in Panel B, the analogous information on the numbers of single 
acquisitions and reversals in the matched sample.  After applying the matching procedures 
described in the next section, we obtain 1,755 acquisitions in the firm-level and 475 in the LEED, 
of these 401 and 61 are reversals, respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
The definition of the wage in the firm data is total payments to workers (not including the 
payroll tax and non-pecuniary benefits) divided by the average number of employees over a 
particular year.
6
  Wages are deflated by yearly CPI and measured in thousands of 2008 Hungarian 
forints (HUF).  The first row of Table 2 shows that unconditional mean wages are twice as large in 
acquired firms as in the always domestic enterprises. 
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 As described in Appendix B, we employ a majority ownership definition of FDI because the alternatives (e.g., 10 
percent, sometimes employed in international statistics) would change the classification (and results) only slightly, and 
in a developing country like Hungary majority control likely represents the more important threshold.  Moreover, the 
acquisitions we study nearly always involve large, discrete jumps in foreign share:  70 percent occur in firms with zero  
foreign share pre-acquisition, and the average post-acquisition share jumps to 92 percent (see Appendix Figure B2). 
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 We also examine the effects of foreign ownership on costs of non-wage benefits. 
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The worker-level data contain information on the monthly base wage, overtime pay, and 
regular payments other than the base wage (such as language and managerial allowances) paid in 
May of each year.  In addition, the data include information on the previous year’s irregular 
payments (such as end-of-year bonuses); for most workers we add 1/12 of this variable to the other 
wage components, but if the worker was hired during the previous calendar year, we divide by the 
number of months the worker spent with the company in that year.  Table 3 shows that by this 
measure the unconditional foreign wage premium is similar in the LEED and the firm-level data. 
In addition to wages, Table 2 also presents firm characteristics and Table 3 provides worker 
characteristics by ownership type.  Measured by the value of tangible assets or by employment, 
firms acquired by foreign investors tend to be much larger and have higher labor productivity 
(value of sales over the average number of employees), compared to always domestic firms.  The 
industrial composition of foreign and domestic firms also differs substantially.  Relative to 
domestic firms, foreign-owned firms are more prevalent in manufacturing and less prevalent in 
most other sectors.  Concerning worker characteristics, the share of females and university and 
high school graduates is higher in foreign-acquired firms, and the shares of vocational and 
elementary education are lower.  Average years of work experience and share of workers hired in 
the previous year are slightly lower under foreign ownership.
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3. Estimation Procedures 
The unconditional means discussed in the previous section suggest large differences in 
observable variables between domestic and foreign-acquired firms in the population of Hungarian 
firms as well as in the LEED sample.  To try to control for other differences, both observable and 
unobservable, we exploit the longitudinal structure of the data as well as the rich set of worker and 
firm characteristics in order to estimate panel regressions with several types of fixed effects and to 
construct matched samples that include a set of control firms similar to those acquired by 
foreigners.  First we describe our regression specifications, which are applied to both matched and 
full samples of observations, and then we discuss the details of the matching procedures. 
 
Regression methods 
The regression samples are always defined to include firms under domestic ownership and 
those that were formerly domestic but have been acquired by foreign investors, but the estimation 
methods vary with the type of data.  For the firm-level data, our basic estimating equation relates 
average wages to ownership status and controls: 
ln(Wjt/Ejt) = δForeignj,t-1 + λt + αj + ujt,       (1) 
where j indexes firms and t indexes years, ln(Wjt/Ejt) is the natural logarithm of the wage bill per 
employee, Foreignj,t-1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm was controlled by 
foreign owners at the end of the previous year (when ownership is measured), δ is the foreign 
effect, the parameter of interest, λt represents 23 year effects, αj are firm fixed effects (FFE), and ujt 
is an error term.  The αj control for time-invariant heterogeneity of wages across firms; in some 
basic specifications we omit the αj and control for industry affiliation and 7 regional establishment 
locations (not collinear with FFE).  Firm-level regressions are weighted by employment. 
This specification is non-parametric; it could be computed as a weighted average of 
differences between foreign acquired and domestic firms  in wages demeaned by region, year, 
and firm.  It is parsimonious in avoiding any attempt to control for time-varying covariates of 
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wages and ownership; variables such as size or productivity that are sometimes included in firm-
level wage equations are potentially endogenous and represent potential channels through which 
ownership may affect wages.  Thus, we control for their average levels with fixed effects, but do 
not remove the effects of changes in these variables after acquisition.
8
 
 The equivalent specification to Equation (1) using LEED can be written: 
lnwijt = δForeignj,t-1 + Xijtβ + λt + αj + vijt,       (2) 
where i indexes workers, j indexes firms and t indexes time.  lnwijt is the natural logarithm of 
individual monthly earnings, Xijt is a vector of individual and job characteristics, λt are year effects, 
αj are firm fixed effects (FFE), and vijt captures unobserved components of individual wages.  
LEED regressions are weighted to reflect the probability of inclusion in the Wage Survey and to 
adjust the sample to the total number of employees in the Hungarian economy. 
 In our specifications, Xijt typically includes three educational categories (VOCATIONAL, 
HIGH SCHOOL, and UNIVERSITY, with ELEMENTARY – less than 9 years of schooling – 
omitted), EXPERIENCE (potential) in level and quadratic form, a dummy variable for female 
employees (FEMALE), and a full set of interactions among these variables.  In an additional 
specification, we add dummy variables for broad occupational categories and whether the worker 
was recently hired in the past year, to control for these aspects of workforce composition.  In some 
specifications, we omit the αj and control for industry affiliation and establishment location. 
Unobserved heterogeneity may vary not only at the firm level, of course, but also within 
groups of workers in the same firm, so in another specification using the LEED we interact the 
firm fixed effect with narrowly defined groups of workers defined by gender, four education 
categories, and eight experience groups.  We also distinguish workers by county (which is defined 
at the plant level) and the resulting grouping is interacted with firm identifiers.  This specification 
thus allows a different intercept for each education-gender-experience-county group within each 
firm, adding about 400,000 worker group-firm fixed effects (WGFE) to the regressions. We also 
add worker fixed effects (WFE) to regressions that focus on incumbent workers, with 
identification coming from the 37 percent of all workers we are able to follow within employers. 
In a further extension of our identification strategy, in some specifications we disaggregate 
Foreignj,t-1 into two types of foreign acquisitions:  (1) single acquisitions (i.e., simple transition 
from domestic to foreign ownership), and (2) foreign acquisitions followed later by divestment to 
domestic owners (i.e., domestic acquisition) after at least one year of foreign ownership (i.e., 
double transition:  domestic-foreign and foreign-domestic).  In the latter case, the foreign effect 
can be estimated twice:  once from each transition.  The specification can include firm fixed effects 
to account for unobserved differences in firms acquired and divested, and a comparison of the 
estimated effects associated with acquisition and divestment provides a “symmetry test” – an 
evaluation of whether any estimated foreign wage effect remains after divestment, or whether 
wages revert to their earlier level and thus tend to be associated with ownership type. 
The detailed characteristics in the LEED enable us to estimate separate FDI effects by 
worker characteristics, including gender, education, experience, recent hire status, and occupation.  
Together with quantile regressions, these results provide information on the potential winners and 
losers from foreign acquisition. 
Although our methods (including the matching procedures described below) are designed 
to minimize selection bias in the sense of correlation between the probability of foreign acquisition 
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clustering method, so the standard errors are robust to both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  See Kézdi (2004) 
for a detailed analysis of autocorrelation and the robust cluster estimator in panel data models. 
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and unobserved influences on wage growth, we also look for evidence of selection effects by 
analyzing the impact of foreign acquisition on worker composition, hiring and separation rates, and 
firm exit.  To examine the relationship of the FDI wage effects with productivity, we employ a 
specification similar to equation (1) with output as dependent variable and capital, labor, and 
materials added to the regressors.  The effects of FDI on wages and productivity are permitted to 
vary with time period of acquisition, GDP per capita of the FDI source country, and state versus 
private ownership of the domestic target. 
 
Matching procedures 
Our description of the basic characteristics of domestically owned and foreign acquired 
firms showed large differences along many dimensions.  To construct a control group as similar as 
possible to the group of acquired firms, we apply propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983).  We match on firm, rather than worker, characteristics both because acquisition is a 
firm-level event and because this allows to use the longitudinal history of firm-level variables in 
the matching process.  We include only those acquisitions which have observations on average 
wages one and two years pre-acquisition, and at least one post-acquisition.  As potential controls 
we also use only those always domestic firms which satisfy this requirement relative to the year 
when we add them among controls. 
Subject to these restrictions, the propensity score is obtained from estimating a probit 
regression on a sample including all years of firms that are always domestic and the acquisition 
year of acquired firms.  Pooling the data produces a much larger sample size for the estimation 
than would year-by-year probits, and therefore we down-weight the potential controls to give equal 
weight in the regression to treated and potential controls.  Independent variables include the 
logarithms of the level and square of average earnings, employment, labor productivity (value of 
sales over employment), capital intensity (value of tangible assets/employment) in the year before 
acquisition; wage and employment growth from two years before acquisition to one year before 
acquisition; and industry and year effects.  By including pre-treatment levels and growth of wages 
among the regressors, we match on not only observable characteristics but unobservables as well. 
The details of the results are reported in Appendix A.  In general, the direction of the 
effects of explanatory variables is the same in the two datasets (Table A1), although none of the 
estimated coefficients are significant at the five percent level in the LEED, where sample size is 
smaller.  Bigger firms with higher average wages, higher productivity and higher capital intensity 
are more likely to be acquired.  Faster growing companies are also more often acquisition targets, 
while wage growth does not seem to have a significant influence on investors’ decisions and the 
point estimate is negative in contrast with the effect of the level of wages. 
Having obtained the propensity score, we enforce common support of its distribution across 
treated and control firms by dropping the treated (control) firms which have larger (smaller) 
propensity score than the largest (smallest) score obtained for control (treated) firms.  On the 
common support we then match exactly on industry and year; within each industry-year cell we 
match (with replacement) each treated firm to its nearest neighbor measured by the propensity 
score.  To check the quality of our matches, we compute normalized mean differences in the 
matching variables between the treated and the control groups one year before acquisition.  Table 
A2 shows that differences are very low, none of them exceeding 0.025.
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Appendix B contains details about the distribution of matched acquisitions over time, 
which are fairly uniform (Table B3), and comparisons of characteristics across the matched and 
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 Imbens and Rubin (2010) suggest that as a rule of thumb differences below 0.25 are acceptable. 
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full samples (Tables B4-B5).  Matched companies are on average larger and more productive, pay 
higher wages, and are more likely to operate in manufacturing relative to the typical firm in the 
data.  Employees in the matched LEED sample are more likely to be female and have higher 
education compared to those in the full LEED. 
Thus, estimates for the matched sample pertain to different types of firms and employees 
than those in the full samples.  To compare the raw foreign wage premium across the full and the 
matched samples, we apply a decomposition suggested by Ñopo (2008) of the total differential into 
three components:  the differential in the matched sample, the differential between matched and 
unmatched domestic firms, and the differential between unmatched and matched foreign-acquired 
firms.  More formally, let E(w|φ), Em(w|φ) and Enm(w|φ) denote the mean of log real wages in the 
full sample, in the matched sample, and in the non-matched part of the full sample, respectively, 
where φ denotes the sample:  φ = F for treated (foreign acquired) firms and φ = D for control 
(always domestic) firms.  Let γt denote the share of observations in each sample that could not be 
matched.  Then we can express mean wages in each sample as a weighted average of the mean in 
the matched part and of the mean in the unmatched part of the full sample.  That is, 
     E(w|φ) = γtEnm(w|φ) + (1-γt)Em(w|φ) = γt[Enm(w|φ) – Em(w|φ)] + Em(w|φ), for φ = F,D. (3) 
Substituting (3) into the wage gap in the full sample, E(w|F) – E(w|D), yields the following 
decomposition: 
E(w|F) – E(w|D) = [Em(w|F) – Em(w|D)] + γT[Enm(w|F) – Em(w|F)] + γC[Em(w|D) – Enm(w|D)],(4) 
where the first term in the sum represents the difference in mean wages between acquired and non-
acquired firms in the matched sample, the second term shows how non-matched treated firms 
differ from matched treated firms (weighted by the relative frequency of non-matched observations 
in the treated group), and the third term gives the wage gap between matched domestic and non-
matched domestic companies (weighted by the relative frequency of non-matched observations in 
the control group). 
To perform the decomposition we first remove year and region effects from log wages by 
running simple pooled OLS regressions and then we estimate (4) non-parametrically by computing 
weighted averages of the residuals.  The results in Table 4 show that the differential in the matched 
sample is around eighty percent of the total gap in the firm data, and about seventy percent in the 
individual data.  Independently of the level of aggregation, matched control firms pay 
approximately 20 percent higher wages than unmatched control firms, increasing the estimate in 
the full samples compared to that on the common support.  Surprisingly, matched treated firms are 
of higher wages than their non-matched peers which decreases the estimated total wage premium. 
Because the matched and full samples represent different subpopulations, we present our findings 
for both of these, as well as for both the firm-level data and the LEED. 
4. Results 
We start with estimates of the average effect of FDI on wages, and then proceed to the 
effects by worker characteristics including demographics, skill measures, occupation, position in 
the wage distribution, and incumbency versus post-acquisition hiring status.  We then turn to the 
analysis of potential measurement and selection issues, including mismeasurement in wages and 
possible changes in worker turnover and composition.  Finally, we study the relationship of the 
estimated wage effects with productivity effects to help interpret our findings.  
As appropriate for the purpose at hand, we present results using both the firm-level and 
worker-level data and both the full and matched samples in order to take advantage of the strengths 
of the different types of data and to examine the robustness of results.  In terms of econometric 
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methods, simple OLS regressions on the full samples function as benchmarks for our attempts to 
distinguish selection bias from causal effects, and they provide measures of average wage 
differentials.  Our attempts to handle selection, or endogeneity of ownership, include matching and 
fixed effects, and it bears emphasis that differences in point estimates across specifications may 
result from changes in identifying variation and changes in sample composition as well as from 
differences in econometric approach. 
 
Estimates of the Average Effect of FDI on Wages 
Table 5 contains basic OLS estimates.  The firm-level results imply a 64 log point foreign 
wage differential controlling only for region and year effects (to account for price differences).  
The estimate falls by 10 points when controls for 2-digit industries are added, thus implying some 
selection of higher wage industries by foreign investors.  The simple average FDI effect estimated 
with the LEED data, shown in the lower panel, first column, implies a 47 log point differential.
10
 
The LEED permit us to include worker characteristics and we report 3 alternative 
specifications:  (1) controls for gender, three educational dummies (vocational, high school, 
university, with elementary education omitted), a quadratic function of potential experience, and 
interactions between these variables which are demeaned to allow the non-interacted variables 
show the average effect, (2) additional controls for job characteristics (a dummy variable 
indicating that the worker was hired during the previous year and seven broad occupational 
categories), (3) additional controls for 2-digit industry.  Job characteristics and industry may well 
be jointly determined with foreign ownership, so these results should be treated with caution but 
they shed light on the robustness of the results, which indeed show little variation across the first 
three specifications.  The inclusion of individual and job characteristics decreases the estimated 
foreign effect by only 4-5 log points.
11
  Including industrial controls further decreases the estimate 
by 10 log points but it is still as large as 0.32.  The estimated wage effects of worker characteristics 
are always highly statistically significant and are in the usual range:  the gender wage gap is 
around 0.2; educational wage premia (relative to elementary) are 0.05-0.10 for vocational studies, 
0.17-0.35 for high school, and 0.54-0.90 for university; and the first year of potential experience is 
estimated to increase wages by 0.18-0.24 with the profile conventionally concave.
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Table 6 adds firm fixed effects (FFE) and worker-group fixed effects (WGFE) to the 
regressions, where the latter use the LEED and controls from specification (2) of Table 5.  
Compared to the OLS results, these estimates are smaller, and the difference provides some 
indication of the magnitude of selection bias (“cream-skimming” or “cherry-picking”) in foreign 
acquisitions based on these types of time-invariant heterogeneity.  In all cases, however, the 
estimates remain sizable and statistically significant:  the firm-level estimate with FFE is 0.27, the 
LEED FFE estimate is 0.16, the WGFE is 0.14, and the results based on the matched data are 2-4 
percentage points smaller.  These magnitudes are in the general range or higher than typical 
regression-adjusted estimates reported in research on the wage effects of trade unionism (e.g., 
Pencavel 1991), firm size (e.g., Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff 1990), gender and race (e.g., Altonji 
and Blank 1999), or job displacement (e.g., Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993). 
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 The difference disappears when we use the same sample (firm-year observations) in both data sets. 
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 With a specification controlling only for gender, education and potential experience, but not their interactions, the 
results are virtually identical to those presented in the table. 
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 The average wage of employees with less than one year of job tenure is 8 to 12 percent less than average wages of 
workers with more than one year of job tenure, and the pattern of estimated coefficients on occupational dummies 
follows typical skill-based patterns.  We do not report these estimates in the table, but they are available on request. 
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The analysis so far did not distinguish between single acquisitions from those when a 
foreign takeover is followed by a divestment.  In the regressions with a single foreign dummy 
variable we made the implicit assumption that the foreign wage effect is symmetric in both 
directions, but an interesting question is whether this assumption is correct.  By estimating separate 
coefficients for firms which experienced both acquisitions and divestments during the period 
observed, and including firm fixed effects, we can estimate the symmetry of the foreign wage 
effect, eliminating any fixed differences between acquisitions and divestments. 
Table 7 presents these results.  Comparing the estimated acquisition effects of initial 
acquisitions followed by reversals with single acquisitions, the former tend to be larger in the full 
sample and smaller in the matched sample, but the differences are not statistically significant.  The 
divestment effects, which measure the wage in the post-divestment domestic period relative to the 
pre-acquisition domestic period, in all cases provide evidence of substantial reversal of the foreign 
wage effect.  In the full sample, the estimated coefficients imply a 37-50 percent post-divestment 
loss of the wage gain associated with foreign acquisition, and in the matched sample, the estimated 
loss ranges from 50 to 80 percent.  In all three matched sample estimates, the post-divestment 
wage level is statistically insignificantly different from the pre-acquisition time period.  These 
results strengthen the interpretation that the estimated foreign acquisition effects do not simply 
reflect the effects of acquisition (as analyzed in research on mergers and acquisitions, including 
Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990; McGuckin and Nguyen 2001; Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom 2009), 
but instead imply systematically different behavior of foreign and domestic owners. 
 
Estimates of FDI Effects by Worker Characteristics 
While the evidence suggests significant positive effects of foreign acquisitions on average 
wages of workers in acquired firms, the LEED permit us to go deeper and estimate heterogeneous 
effects for workers with different demographic and human capital characteristics.  Perhaps the 
positive average effects conceal variation such that some workers experience losses while others 
gain.  If foreign ownership is associated with better technology that is complementary with human 
capital, then the gains may not be equally shared but rather biased towards higher skilled 
employees, defined by education, occupation, or position in the wage distribution.  Finally, it is 
possible that even in the context of overall wage increases that incumbent workers, those hired pre-
acquisition, may suffer wage losses. 
To test these hypotheses, we interact the Foreign variable with worker characteristics and 
estimate regressions otherwise the same as equation (2).  In a first set of regressions we examine 
standard characteristics:   gender, education category, years of work experience, and recent hire 
status.  In a second set we examine variation by occupation, in a third set we consider position in 
the wage distribution, and in the fourth we estimate separate effects for incumbents relative to 
those hired post-acquisition. 
Concerning the first set, Table 8 shows that the estimated wage effect of foreign acquisition 
on the reference group (defined as male employees with elementary education, 10 to 20 years of 
work experience, and not recently hired) varies from 0.9 to 0.14 across the four specifications, and 
it is always statistically significantly different from zero.  The estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms allow us to compute estimated foreign acquisition effects for 64 different types of 
workers (2 gender categories, 4 education types, 4 experience groups, and recent hire or not recent 
hire).  The results vary somewhat across specifications, but all of them imply that foreign 
ownership increases the wages for all 64 of these groups. 
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The extent of the gain varies across groups, in a pattern that is broadly consistent across 
specifications.  The biggest winners from foreign acquisition are university graduates, whose 
estimated gains range from 24 to 37 percent.  In all specifications, there is a tendency for higher 
gains at higher education levels.  On the other hand, returns to experience are estimated to decline 
under foreign ownership, but not enough to reverse the overall positive effect, even for workers 
with more than 30 years of experience.  The estimated gender wage differential is little affected by 
foreign acquisition as well as the differential between recent hires and more senior workers. 
Turning to differences in the foreign wage effect across occupations, Table 9 shows the 
results from interacting Foreign with broad occupations (approximately1-digit level).  Again, the 
estimated effects are all positive and almost always statistically significant, and again they show 
evidence of skill-bias, with larger increases in higher skilled occupations.    
To examine how the foreign effect varies along the wage distribution, we report quantile 
regression results for each 10
th
 quantile in Figure 2.  The estimated coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at each quantile, and they show a mild upward slope. While more highly 
paid workers indeed benefit more from foreign acquisitions than do lower earners, even the lowest 
wage category is estimated to receive a significant foreign wage premium. 
The final heterogeneity issue concerns incumbents, defined as workers hired pre-
acquisition, versus non-incumbents.  For this analysis, as discussed in the data section above, we 
use longitudinal links of workers remaining with the same employer over time in order to measure 
whether the employee was hired before or after acquisition; in the matched sample of controls, we 
can also designate as “incumbents” those workers who were hired prior to the acquisition of the 
paired treated firm.  In the matched sample estimates, we can include an incumbent dummy for 
employees of control firms observed both before and after the acquisition of the matched treated 
firm; this controls for any systematic differences between incumbents and non-incumbents that 
may reflect longer tenure, for instance.  Using the linked information also permits us to include 
worker fixed effects (WFE) in the regression.  Compared to our other specifications these 
estimates should be treated with more caution because of error in identifying incumbents and 
because the linked time series for most workers are quite short:  to contribute at all to identification 
of the foreign coefficient we need at least one observation on a worker’s wage before and at least 
one after acquisition, but nearly half of workers with pre- and post-acquisition observations have 
only a single observation either pre- or post-acquisition.  Thus, the WFE results likely suffer from 
more attenuation bias than other specifications. 
With these caveats, Table 10 contains the estimation results.  In the full sample, the 
estimated effects of foreign acquisition on incumbents and non-incumbents are fairly similar in the 
FFE and WGFE specifications, the incumbent effect some 3 percentage points lower.  The 
demanding WFE specification, which can be estimated only for incumbents (since non-incumbents 
are not observed pre- and post-acquisition), implies a smaller coefficient, but nevertheless a 6 
percent positive effect.  The results in this case suggest a greater non-incumbent – incumbent gap, 
but once again all estimates, including in the demanding WFE specification, imply positive effects 
of foreign ownership on wages.  In the final column of Table 10, we include only workers for 
whom we have at least two post-acquisition observations, in an attempt to reduce the attenuation 
bias in the estimates, and the estimated coefficients are indeed larger by one and one-half 
percentage points in the full and matched samples, respectively.  An alternative explanation is that 
workers with more post-acquisition observations have higher wages because of different employee 
retention patterns in foreign versus domestic enterprises.  As discussed in the next sub-section, 
however, we are unable to find significant impacts of acquisitions on worker separations. 
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Measurement and Selection Issues 
One potential concern about these estimated wage effects of foreign ownership is possible 
measurement error in wages that is correlated with ownership.  First, hours worked may differ 
under domestic and foreign ownership.  The annual and monthly wage variables in the firm data 
and LEED, respectively, do not capture variation in working hours.  From 1999, however, the 
LEED contain a variable measuring usual hours worked that we use as the dependent variable in a 
variant of Equation (2).  The estimated Foreign effects are small and imprecisely estimated, 
implying that hours are little affected by foreign acquisition.
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Second, wages may be underreported for tax reasons; for instance, if underreporting is 
more prevalent in domestic firms the estimated foreign effect may be upward biased.  While this 
hypothesis is inherently very difficult to test, we examine two types of evidence.   The first extends 
Equations (1) and (2) to interact Foreign with a “cheating index” (drawn from Elek et al. 2009) 
representing the extent of cheating by industry.  The estimates, presented in Appendix Table A4, 
imply that the foreign wage differential is larger in industries where underreporting is less likely, 
which runs counter to the hypothesis that our results are driven by underreporting of domestic 
firms.  Second, because anecdotal information suggests that cheating frequently happens by 
declaring that only the minimum wage was paid, we replace the dependent variable in the LEED 
regression (2) with a dummy indicating whether the worker was paid very close to the minimum 
wage that year (defined as being paid less than 3 percent above the minimum wage).  The 
estimates show a lower incidence of minimum wage workers in foreign employers, but the small 
magnitudes of the coefficient (0.038-0.066) together with the low overall incidence (about 10 
percent) implies that this cannot explain the 13-25 percent foreign premium. 
A third measurement issue is the possibility that the wage variables do not account for non-
wage fringe benefits.  In principle, it is possible that foreign owners shift compensation more 
towards cash and away from non-cash forms.  The LEED contains no information on non-cash 
compensation, but the firm-level data include an accounting measure of employer costs for 
employee benefits.  If we use the log of this variable as the dependent variable in an extension of 
equation (1) using firm-level data, the estimated effect of FDI on benefits is even larger than the 
estimated effect on wages in the full sample, and it is very similar effect to the estimated wage 
effect in the matched sample.
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Another potential concern in interpreting our estimates of the wage impact of foreign 
ownership is the possibility of residual selection on time-varying unobservables correlated with 
both wages and foreign acquisitions, conditional on our matching procedures and regression 
controls.  The absence of such unobserved and unaccounted-for factors is the basic identifying 
assumption necessary to give a causal interpretation to our estimates.  While the assumption is not 
directly testable, we can use the data to provide some evidence on differences in worker and firm 
turnover, employment levels, and worker composition by ownership type, that may help provide 
some indirect indications of the extent of this problem. 
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in our LEED regressions, but the wage variable includes several types of payments which do not vary directly with 
hours worked, and the very small impact of FDI on hours implies that hourly wage results would be nearly identical to 
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collar workers, but regressions restricted to blue collar workers yield similar results. 
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We first examine the impact of foreign acquisition on hiring and separation rates.  Only the 
LEED can be used for this analysis, as the firm-level data contain no worker turnover information, 
and we also focus on the matched sample where pre- and post-acquisition periods can be defined 
for both acquisitions and controls.  Hiring is defined using the recent hire variable, and because it 
refers to the previous calendar year, we omit the first year after acquisition from the regression.  
Separation is estimated on the sample of linked workers only, for whom separation can reliably be 
calculated.  In both cases, we present both FFE and WGFE linear probability model estimates of 
the impact of Foreign on overall probabilities as well as a specification where we interact Foreign 
with the worker’s wage (logged and demeaned in the regression sample), so that the coefficient on 
the interacted variable provides a measure of the degree to which worker turnover influences the 
foreign wage effects we have estimated. 
The results in Table 11 show only tiny differences in the hiring and separation probabilities 
between acquired and domestic firms.  In the FFE specification, for example, the estimated effect 
of Foreign is -0.00 on the hiring rate and 0.01 on the separation rate, both with larger standard 
errors than coefficients.  The estimated coefficients differ little in the WGFE regressions.  When 
we include the interaction with the wage, the results show no tendency for hiring or separation 
under foreign ownership to be higher among high-wage workers with either FFE or WGFE.   
Table 12 uses the matched firm-level sample, to examine the impact of foreign acquisition 
on two aspects of selection at the firm level:  employment changes and survival.  Again, for both 
variables, we present estimates of the impact of Foreign on overall rates as well as a specification 
where we interact Foreign with the worker’s wage, defined for the pre-acquisition year (to avoid 
mixing wage effects with any employment and exit effects of FDI.  The estimates imply little 
difference in both employment and exit behavior between domestic and foreign firms.  The one 
statistically significant coefficient in the table is the wage interaction for exit; at 0.007 it implies 
that doubling the average pre-acquisition wage of an acquired firm raises the probability of exit by 
0.007.  This result would be consistent with negative selection (higher wage foreign firms are less 
likely to survive, implying we would have estimated a larger foreign effect had they not exited), 
but the magnitude is too small to matter for our estimated wage effects.
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A final selection issue concerns the composition of the workforce in terms of observables.  
Although our LEED regressions control for workforce characteristics, sometimes in an extremely 
detailed way through worker group fixed effects (WGFE), changes in workforce composition may 
suggest that a selection mechanism is underway within firms.  If unobservables and observables 
are highly correlated, the change in observables provides a guide to underlying changes in 
unobservables (e.g., Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005). For this purpose, we use the LEED to 
estimate equations where the dependent variables are worker characteristics and the right hand size 
is the same as in Equation (1).  Except for experience, the dependent variables are binary and we 
estimate linear probability models.  We always include firm fixed effects (FFE), so that the 
estimated Foreign coefficients show how the workforce changes after acquisition relative to the 
pre-acquisition within-firm composition. 
The results of this analysis, which appear in Table 13, show only small changes in 
composition for most worker types, including in terms of gender, experience, and most types of 
education.  The only substantial change is in university graduates, whose probability rises 4.5 
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percent in acquired firms.  Relative to a baseline of about 10 percent in the total sample, this 
impact is further evidence of skill-biased restructuring in foreign acquired employers and it 
suggests that foreign acquired firms engage more intensively in selection of workers based on 
observable (and possibly unobservable) skill-related characteristics.  However, the results cannot 
account for the sizable wage effects we find for all types of workers as well as for average wages.   
This analysis of various aspects of worker and firm selection into foreign acquisition does 
not allow us to entirely rule out an important role for selection on unobservables, and indeed no 
non-experimental evidence ever does.  For instance, even if we could follow all workers 
longitudinally and compute unobserved time-invariant wage components for each worker based on 
worker fixed effects (as in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999), we would still have to contend 
with endogenous mobility and nonrandom allocation of workers across employers.  Nonetheless, 
the available evidence is sufficient for us to entertain the possibility that the wage effects of 
foreign ownership we have estimated reflect genuine changes in behavior. 
 
Productivity and Wage Effects of Foreign Ownership 
What theoretical mechanisms might account for genuine foreign effects on wages?  Some 
possibilities include shared gains from innovation or restructuring leading to improved firm 
performance, compensating differentials possibly associated with higher effort, and efficiency 
wages to reduce worker turnover or shirking.  While our purpose is not to distinguish their separate 
contributions, a common theme in these mechanisms is that the wage gains from foreign 
acquisition should be associated with productivity improvements, and the largest gains should be 
observed where the scope for improvement is greatest.
16
  With this motivation, we estimate 
productivity effects of FDI and examine the variation of our estimated wage effects by the level of 
development of the source country, the time period (early versus late transition), and the ownership 
of the target (state versus private). 
Our productivity regressions are extensions of Equation (1) with ln(real 
output/employment) as dependent variable.
17
  In one productivity specification, we also include 
capital and material costs per workers (thus implying a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function).  For consistency, and we estimate identical models with the firm-level 
average wage as dependent variable in order to be able to compare the estimated wage and 
productivity effects.  Table 14 reports results for two versions of these regressions, varying with 
whether or not the capital and material cost factors are included in each equation.  When these 
factors are not included, in the first row, the estimated productivity effect of FDI (0.26) is slightly 
larger the estimated wage effect (0.25), but when the factors are included the difference is reversed 
(0.16 versus 0.20), but in neither case is the difference statistically or economically significant.  
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this argument would have acquisition leading to expropriation of workers’ quasi-rents (e.g., Shleifer and Summers 
1988; Gokhale, Groshen, and Neumark 1995), which seems moot given our finding of wage growth after acquisition. 
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productivity effects of FDI tend to move together across firms or groups of firms, as we do here. 
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These results provide evidence that foreign acquisitions raise productivity, consistent with a 
genuine effect on wages. 
Moreover, the residuals across the two equations are highly correlated:  0.24-0.46, 
depending on specification.  Thus, firms that raise wages more than predicted by the regression 
specification also tend to raise productivity more than predicted.  A scatter plot of the wage and 
productivity residuals in acquired firms post-acquisition makes the same point graphically in 
Figure 3.  Firms estimated to raise wages post-acquisition are twice as likely to raise productivity 
as not.  Again, these results suggest that the FDI-wage relationship is part of a genuine change in 
firm behavior and not purely an artifact of selection bias. 
Perhaps these productivity results also provide some clue to the larger wage effects of FDI 
in Hungary compared to previous research in other countries.  One possibility is that Hungarian 
firms started the transition in the 1990s backward technologically and organizationally, far from 
the frontier, and thus it was relatively easy for foreign investors to raise productivity and wages.  
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate different wage effects by three factors:  GDP per capita of 
the foreign investor, time period, and nature of the target.  Concerning the first of these, our 
hypothesis is that investors from more developed countries (proxied by GDP per capita relative to 
Hungary’s) would be likely to bring more advanced technology and organizational capital and so 
increase labor productivity more than those from less developed countries.
18
  We examine 
differences in wage effects of FDI by time period (the early transition period up to 1998 versus late 
transition thereafter) motivated by Hungary’s rapid development once transition began, EU 
accession gradually became imminent, and was finalized in 2004.  We also disaggregate target 
firms by ownership into state and privately owned firms with the hypothesis that state-owned firms 
are further from their production possibilities frontier so that FDI may have a larger effect. 
Results for both the productivity and wage regressions with these specifications appear in 
Table 15.  The interaction term between the relative GDP per capita and the foreign acquisition 
dummy variable is positive and significant for both wages and productivity, showing that the 
foreign wage effects are higher for more developed sending countries.  Early and late acquisitions 
have similar estimated wage effects for both wages and productivity, with point estimates slightly 
larger in the late period, although the difference is slight and statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level.  Finally, the estimated FDI effect is larger for state-owned targets for both 
variables, but again the estimated productivity effect is slightly larger than that for wages.  In this 
case, the difference is larger in the firm-level data than in the LEED.   
Taken together, the results suggest that the wage effects of FDI tend to rise with the 
potential for productivity improvement.  Nevertheless, all the coefficients are positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero, implying that both types of firms and in both periods 
FDI led to wage increases. 
5. Conclusion 
Are there true “employer effects” on wages, or is firm behavior merely passive in 
conveying the market forces of product demand, production technology, and factor supply?  
Answering this question definitively faces daunting identification problems.  Even with ideal data 
sets that contain long panels of linked workers and firms covering entire economies, which in 
principle would permit the estimation of separate fixed effects for each worker and each firm (as in 
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999), the researcher has to contend with non-random switching 
and matching behavior of firms and workers. 
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An alternative approach is to examine systematic differences in wages associated with firm 
characteristics, and with this motivation we have focused in this paper on foreign ownership.  An 
advantage of this focus compared with some other firm (or individual) characteristics, such as size 
or industry (or gender or education), is that foreign versus domestic ownership is essentially a 
discrete variable that can switch suddenly, as is the case with the acquisitions we study in this 
paper.  The analysis can therefore exploit changes over time, a dimension of the data unavailable 
to studies of time-invariant or slowly varying and continuous characteristics (e.g., Goux and 
Maurin 1999 on industry, and Troske 1999 on firm size). 
The evidence in this paper comes from two remarkable data sets, one covering every 
Hungarian firm over a 23-year period, and the other a probability sample of about 8 percent of all 
Hungarian employees, from which we have constructed LEED.  A drawback of the data is the lack 
of a unique worker identifier that would allow us to compute worker fixed effects based on 
observed job mobility, although we are able to track most workers within firms longitudinally, 
including those who remain employed after a foreign acquisition.  Moreover, our data have the 
unusual advantage of coming from a country and time period with large variation in foreign 
ownership, our variable of interest.  Data sets from other countries may have worker panels, but 
they generally have many fewer acquisitions with which to identify a foreign wage effect.  Data 
quality and identifying variation are both important prerequisites for empirical evidence. 
Our methods applied to these data include matching on a rich set of pre-acquisition 
variables including lagged wages, in order to construct a control group of non-acquired firms.  We 
apply panel data methods identified through foreign acquisitions and find estimates lying in the 
range of 13 to 27 percent.  These magnitudes of the estimated causal effects – while smaller than 
the 40-60 percent raw wage differentials, implying significant selection effects in foreign 
acquisitions – are similar or greater than typical estimates of other wage effects in the literature, for 
instance due to unions, job displacement, firm size, gender, race, or industry.  Our methods also 
exploit the presence of “reversals” in the data – foreign acquisitions followed by later divestment 
back to domestic owners.  The result that much of the wage gains from acquisition tend to be 
reversed following divestment is suggestive that foreign ownership has a causal effect on wages. 
Using the LEED, our estimates can control for worker demographic and human capital 
characteristics including for worker group fixed effects, defined for cells on the basis of full 
interactions of firm-gender-age group-education group-tenure group.  They also permit us to 
estimate effects for different types of workers, thus to examine the characteristics of “winners” and 
“losers” in the data.  Among 64 groups defined by gender, age, education, and tenure, we do not 
find a single group estimated to suffer wage losses from acquisition.  Similarly, we find wage 
gains for occupations (defined at the major group level) and for all quantiles of the wage 
distribution (measured at each decile).  All of these groups are estimated to receive wage gains 
from foreign acquisition, although the gains are larger for workers with university education, and 
those in higher skilled occupations and higher wage quantiles.  For the longitudinally linked 
workers in the LEED, we are also able to estimate a foreign wage effect for incumbents, which we 
find to be smaller than for non-incumbents but in any case positive and statistically significant 
despite the poorer quality (principally, shorter time series) of these data. 
Do these estimated foreign effects on wages reflect true changes in behavior of firms after 
foreign acquisition?  The reversal of the wage effect in divestitures provides particularly strong 
support for such a conclusion, which is reinforced by the remarkably uniform wage effect across 
most types of workers, suggesting a general change in firm behavior.  To explore alternative 
interpretations, however, we consider several measurement and selection issues.  The results show 
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no evidence that differences in wage reporting, hours worked, or fringe benefits across foreign and 
domestic firms could account for the estimated foreign wage premium, and little evidence of 
differences in worker or firm turnover.  The data do show some shift in the composition of 
employment towards university-educated workers at firms acquired by foreign investors, 
consistent with some skill bias in foreign management and restructuring, but by itself not 
accounting for the positive wage premia overall and for all skill groups that we have estimated. 
Finally, we consider foreign ownership effects on productivity in order to assess an 
important correlate in most theoretical accounts of higher wages in foreign firms as well as to 
provide some evidence on why our findings might differ from some of those in the literature.  
Using matching and panel data methods applied to production functions, we find that FDI strongly 
raises productivity and that the magnitudes of the productivity and wage effects are similar on 
average and highly correlated across matched pairs of acquired and non-acquired firms.  We also 
find that the wage and productivity effects both increase strongly in the level of development of 
the FDI source country and that it is greater for state-owned than private targets; on the other hand, 
we observe little fall in the estimated acquisition effects when we permit them to vary between 
early (pre-1999) and late (post-1998) periods. 
Why do our results paint such a consistent picture of foreign owners changing firm 
behavior, while previous research – particularly using LEED – has produced inconsistent results, 
including some cases where foreign effects are insignificantly different from zero?  The 
differences may lie in data, methods, and context.  As we have emphasized, the size of our data – 
in the cross-section, the time-series, and the number of switchers providing identifying variation – 
permits us to use different methods and perhaps draw stronger inferences than would otherwise be 
possible.  Another possibility could be that foreign owners make a bigger difference in less 
developed settings, and Hungary is a less-developed economy than others for which LEED have 
been analyzed (mostly northern European economies).  With the exception of the little change in 
the estimated effects over the Hungarian transition, our results provide some support for a “catch-
up” interpretation in which the wage effect of foreign acquisitions is higher when the target firm is 
farther behind the productivity frontier. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1:  Evolution of the Share of Foreign Acquisitions, 
Firm-Level Data and LEED 
 
Notes:  N = 2,475,478 worker-years for the LEED sample and 1,881,267 firm-years for the firms 
sample.  Sample consists of domestic firms and previously domestic firms that have been acquired 
by a foreign owner.  Percent foreign firms = percent of firms majority foreign owned.  Foreign 
share in total employment = percentage of employees employed by majority-foreign owned firms.  
LEED = Linked Employer-Employee Data. 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Wages by Quantile 
 
Notes:  N = 2,475,478 worker-years for the full LEED and 395,053 for the matched LEED 
sample.  Regression coefficients on foreign acquisition from quantile regressions that 
control for region, year and industry effects, and for post-divestment domestic period of 
acquired firms that are resold to domestic owners. All estimated effects are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 3:  Scatter Plot of Wage and Productivity 
Residuals (Matched Sample, Post-Acquisition Years) 
 
Notes:  N = 1,371 matched firm-pairs.  The dots represent the post-
acquisition difference (Δ) within matched pairs (acquired minus non-
acquired firms) of the mean post-acquisition residuals from regressions 
with log(wage) and log(labor productivity) as dependent variables, 
controlling for year-industry interactions.  The mean value of productivity 
differences = 0.084; mean value of wage differences = 0.050.  The 
regression line on the graph (with SEs in parentheses) is the following: 
Δ(mean residual wage) = 0.017(0.011) + 0.425**(0.036)Δ(mean residual 
productivity).  210 observations where abs(Δ(residuals)) > 1.5 are dropped 
from the graph. 
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Table 1:  Number of Observations on Foreign Acquisitions with Pre- 
and Post-Treatment Wage Information – Full and Matched Samples 
 
 Data Type 
 Firm-Level LEED 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Total Number of Acquisitions 4,926 644 
Single Acquisitions: Domestic-Foreign 3,943 558 
Reversals: Domestic-Foreign-Domestic 983 86 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
Total Number of Acquisitions 1,755 475 
Single Acquisitions: Domestic-Foreign  1,354 414 
Reversals: Domestic-Foreign-Domestic 401 61 
Notes:  The table shows the numbers of firms acquired by foreign investors either as a 
“single acquisition,” where only one ownership change (from domestic to foreign 
ownership) is observed, or as “reversals,” where a foreign acquisition is later followed by a 
divestment from foreign to domestic owners; in both cases, only firms with pre- and post-
change wage information are included.  For acquisitions by year, see Table A2a, and for 
total number of switches, see Tables A2b and A2c.  Definition of foreign ownership:  > 50% 
foreign-owned. 
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Table 2:  Firm Characteristics by Ownership –  
Firm-Level Data and LEED 
 
 Firm-Level Data  LEED 
 Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign 
Average Wage  1,027.1 2,213.5  1,455.5 2,632.9 
 (1,689.4) (2,468.9)  (1,451.4) (1,703.7) 
Tangible Assets 162.5 2,146.7  1,365.0 9,553.1 
 (6,319.8) (21,513.2)  (20,513.4) (50,248.3) 
Employment 22.4 129.9  167.3 524.2 
 (361.0) (622.0)  (1,134.8) (1,196.0) 
Labor Productivity 22.8 51.3  21.8 35.4 
 (178.3) (310.0)  (309.6) (68.4) 
N (firm-years) 1,857,288     23,968  119,285    3,657 
Industry in 2000 (%)      
Agriculture 5.0 2.6  13.3 3.6 
Mining & utilities 0.6 1.8  2.5 4.6 
Manufacturing 17.3 30.1  32.4 59.4 
Construction 10.1 3.2  11.2 3.6 
Trade & repair 31.2 35.6  19.0 10.9 
FIRE 5.3 5.5  4.8 5.0 
Business services 19.3 10.6  7.8 6.3 
Other services 11.2 10.7  9.0 6.6 
N (firms) 91,429 1,659  8,458 303 
Notes:  Unweighted unconditional means and standard deviations.  Average wage computed as annual wage bill 
divided by employment and measured in thousands of 2008 HUF, tangible assets and labor productivity in millions 
of 2008 HUF, all deflated by CPI.  Standard deviations in parentheses for continuous variables.  Industrial 
distribution measured as percentages within ownership type.  Definition of industries follows NACE Rev. 1.1.  
Agriculture includes hunting, fishing, and forestry.  FIRE includes finance, insurance, and real estate. Business 
services include renting of equipment, computer and related activities, research, and other business activities.  Other 
services cover hotels and restaurants, transport and communications, and other community, social and personal 
services. 
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Table 3:  Individual Characteristics by 
Ownership – LEED 
 
 Domestic Foreign 
Monthly Earnings 137.3 240.3 
  (2008 HUF, 1000s) (120.8) (250.6) 
Female (%) 38.1 42.6 
Education (%)   
Elementary 27.1 16.5 
Vocational 33.9 28.4 
High school 30.2 36.4 
University 8.8 18.7 
Experience (years) 22.7 21.5 
 (11.0) (10.8) 
Recent Hire (%) 11.2 10.0 
Occupation (%)   
Elementary Occupations 10.1 4.7 
Skilled Manual Workers 46.8 45.6 
Service Workers 10.3 7.1 
Clerks 7.5 6.2 
Associate Professionals 12.7 18.5 
Professionals 4.1 8.9 
Managers 8.6 9.0 
N (worker-years) 2,339,534 135,944 
Notes:  Weighted unconditional means and standard deviations.  
Earnings measured in thousands of 2008 HUF, deflated by CPI.  
Female, education, recent hire and occupation measured as 
percentages of total workforce by ownership type.  Standard 
deviations in parentheses.  The definition of occupations follows 
ISCO-88 where Elementary Occupations, Service Workers, Clerks, 
Associate Professionals, Professionals and Managers coincide with 
the corresponding major groups; while Skilled Manual Workers cover 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers, Craft and related trades 
workers and Plant and machine operators and assemblers. 
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Table 4:  Decomposition of Wage Differentials between Foreign 
Acquisitions and Domestic Firms 
 
 Data Type 
 Firm-Level LEED 
Total mean wage differential: 
     Foreign – Domestic 0.583 0.442 
Differential in Matched Sample 0.485 0.309 
Differential between:   
Non-Matched and Matched Treated -0.111 -0.055 
Matched and Non-Matched Control 0.210 0.189 
N 1,881,267 2,475,478 
Notes:  Estimates of Equation (4), a non-parametric decomposition of the foreign-
domestic wage gap in the full sample (following Ñopo 2008).  Differentials are based 
on weighted averages of residuals from pooled OLS regressions of log wages on region 
and year effects.  Difference between non-matched and matched treated firms is 
weighted by the share of non-matched treated firms in the universe of treated firms.  
Difference between matched and non-matched control firms is weighted by the share of 
non-matched control firms in the universe of control firms.  All results are weighted by 
sample weights.  N = firm-years in the firm-level data and worker-years in the LEED. 
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Table 5:  The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Wages -  
OLS Estimates with Full Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm-Level Data 
      Foreign 0.639**  -  - 0.536** 
 (0.042)  -  - (0.025) 
      Industry effects No  -  - Yes 
R
2
 0.162  -  - 0.307 
LEED Sample 
      Foreign 0.474** 0.430** 0.419** 0.321** 
 (0.040)  (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.021) 
      Female - -0.215** -0.196** -0.174** 
 -   (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
      Vocational - 0.098** 0.051** 0.060** 
 - (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
      High school - 0.350** 0.202** 0.170** 
 - (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
      University - 0.895** 0.582** 0.538** 
 - (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) 
      Experience - 0.024** 0.019** 0.018** 
 - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      Experience
2
/100 - -0.034** -0.027** -0.024** 
 - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      Interactions of characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
      Job characteristics No No Yes Yes 
      Industry effects No No No Yes 
R
2
 0.125 0.360 0.406 0.464 
Notes:  Estimates of Equations (1) and (2) without firm fixed effects or matching. Dependent variable = 
ln(real wagebill/employment) in firm-level data and ln(real gross earnings) in LEED.  Foreign = 1 if the 
firm is majority foreign owned in t-1.  All equations include year, region, and divestment period effects.  
Columns (2)-(4) add full interactions between gender, education, and experience.  Columns (3)-(4) add 
dummy variables for workers hired in the previous calendar year and for seven broad occupational groups.  
Industry effects in column (4) are two-digit NACE industries.  Sample includes firms always under 
domestic ownership and foreign-owned firms that were previously domestic (i.e., acquisitions).  N = 
1,881,267 firm-years for firm-level data and 2,475,478 worker-years for LEED.  Standard errors 
(corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.  ** = significant at 0.01. 
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Table 6:  The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Wages - 
Estimates with Fixed Effects and Matching 
 
 Firm-Level LEED 
 FFE FFE WGFE 
Full Sample    
Foreign 0.286** 0.177** 0.148** 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.021) 
 R
2
-within 0.251 0.339 0.097 
 N 1,881,267 2,475,478 2,475,478 
Matched Sample    
Foreign 0.248** 0.130** 0.128** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) 
 R
2
-within 0.403 0.433 0.103 
 N 44,406 395,053 395,053 
Notes: Estimates of Equations (1) and (2). Dependent variable = ln(real wage 
costs/employment) in firm-level data and ln(real gross earnings) in LEED. Foreign = 1 if the 
firm is majority foreign owned in t-1. FFE = firm fixed effect; WGFE = worker-group fixed 
effects, based on interactions of gender, experience group, education group, county, and firm.  
All regressions include divestment period, year, and region effects (regions pertain to 
establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  The FFE specification with the LEED also 
includes gender, education, experience, and their interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  N = 
firm-years in firm-level data, worker-years in LEED.  ** = significant at 0.01. 
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Table 7:  Estimated FDI Effects on Wages for Single Acquisitions 
and Reversals – Firm-Level Data and LEED 
 
 Firm-Level LEED 
 FFE FFE WGFE 
Full Sample    
Single Acquisitions (Domestic-Foreign) 
   Foreign 0.282** 0.169** 0.136** 
 (0.031) (0.020) (0.022) 
Reversals (Domestic-Foreign-Domestic) 
   Foreign  0.303** 0.216** 0.202** 
 (0.045) (0.031) (0.031) 
   Divestment 0.174** 0.125** 0.125** 
 (0.062) (0.036) (0.036) 
R
2
-within 0.251 0.340 0.097 
N 1,881,267 2,475,478 2,475,478 
Matched Sample     
Single Acquisitions (Domestic-Foreign) 
   Foreign 0.253** 0.132** 0.127** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.032) 
Reversals (Domestic-Foreign-Domestic) 
   Foreign 0.216** 0.111** 0.135** 
 (0.056) (0.027) (0.030) 
   Divestment 0.079 0.021 0.070 
 (0.058) (0.044) (0.057) 
R
2
-within 0.403 0.433 0.103 
N 44,406 395,053 395,053 
Notes:  Foreign = 1 if the firm is majority foreign owned in t-1.  Divestment = 1 if the firm was 
majority domestic in t-1 but had been majority foreign in a prior year and majority domestic 
still earlier.  The Divestment effect is measured relative to the first domestic period; i.e., for 
firms previously acquired by foreign and later divested to domestic owners, it measures the 
post-divestment wage differential relative to the pre-acquisition period. FFE = firm fixed effect; 
WGFE = worker-group fixed effects, based on interactions of gender, experience group, 
education group, county, and firm.  All regressions include year and region effects (the latter 
pertain to establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  The FFE specification with the LEED 
also includes gender, education, experience, and their interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  
N = firm-years in firm-level data, worker-years in LEED.  ** = significant at 0.01. 
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Table 8:  Estimated FDI Effects on Wages by Worker Characteristics - Gender, 
Education, Experience, and Recent Hire 
 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
 FFE WGFE FFE WGFE 
Foreign Effect for 
Reference Group 
0.129** 
(0.022) 
0.139** 
(0.034) 
0.116** 
(0.035) 
0.087* 
(0.035) 
Foreign interactions with:   
  Female -0.014 0.021 -0.017 0.019 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) 
  Vocational 0.019 -0.004 0.017 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
  High school 0.046** 0.026 0.048** 0.065** 
 (0.013) (0.027) (0.015) (0.019) 
  University 0.239** 0.119** 0.118** 0.168** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) (0.028) 
  Experience: 0-10 years -0.033** -0.012 -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) 
  Experience: 21-30 years -0.013 -0.042** -0.038** -0.041** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
  Experience: 30+ years -0.010 -0.056** -0.044** -0.057* 
 (0.010) (0.020) (0.017) (0.025) 
  Recent Hire -0.034* -0.001 -0.009 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.022) (0.023) 
R
2
-within 0.333 0.101 0.424 0.110 
N (worker-years) 2,475,478 2,475,478 395,053 395,053 
Notes:  The table shows the estimated acquisition effect for a reference group and the estimated foreign wage 
returns to individual characteristics relative to the reference group.  Reference group:  male with elementary 
education and 11-20 years of potential labor market experience, not recent hires.  Results are derived from an 
extension of Equation (2) using the LEED where the acquisition dummy is interacted with individual 
characteristics.  All regressions include divestment period, year and region effects (the latter pertain to 
establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  The FFE specification also includes gender, education, 
experience, and their interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  ** = significant at 0.01. 
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Table 9:  Estimated FDI Effects on Wages by Worker Occupation  
 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
Foreign interactions FFE WGFE FFE WGFE 
Manager 0.478** 0.328** 0.216** 0.195** 
 (0.045) (0.050) (0.046) (0.044) 
Professional 0.361** 0.240** 0.277** 0.245** 
 (0.043) (0.033) (0.046) (0.034) 
Associate Professional 0.163** 0.143** 0.168** 0.155** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.044) (0.036) 
Skilled non-manual 0.122** 0.092** 0.110** 0.091** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) 
Service 0.088 0.073 0.116 0.130 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.062) (0.069) 
Skilled manual 0.121** 0.122** 0.090** 0.090** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) 
Unskilled 0.123** 0.158** 0.105** 0.108** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) (0.034) 
R
2
-within 0.327 0.201 0.432 0.243 
N (worker-years) 2,475,478 2,475,478 395,053 395,053 
Notes:  The table shows the estimated acquisition effects for the listed occupational groups using the LEED 
samples.  Coefficients and standard errors from an extension of Equation (2) where the foreign dummy is 
interacted with occupational group dummies.  All regressions include divestment period, year and region 
effects (regions pertain to establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  The FFE specification also includes 
gender, education, experience, and their interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  ** = significant at 0.01.    
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Table 10:  Estimated FDI Effects on Wages of Incumbent and Non-Incumbent Workers 
 
Foreign interactions FFE WGFE WFE 
WFE 
restricted 
Full Sample    
 
Non-incumbent 0.186** 0.158** --- --- 
 (0.021) (0.022)   
Incumbent 0.149** 0.120** 0.057** 0.067** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) 
R
2
-within 0.340 0.097 0.088 0.088 
N (worker-years) 2,475,478 2,475,478 2,475,478 2,449,923 
Matched Sample      
Non-incumbent 0.153** 0.154** --- --- 
 (0.026) (0.032)   
Incumbent 0.064** 0.063** 0.036* 0.041* 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.017) (0.019) 
R
2
-within 0.434 0.106 0.125 0.133 
N (worker-years) 395,053 395,053 395,053 351,969 
Notes: These estimates result from an extension of Equation (2) using the LEED that permits the foreign effect to 
vary between incumbents and non-incumbents. Incumbents defined as workers followed over time with at least 
one wage observation in the pre-acquisition period and at least one observation post-acquisition.  FFE = firm fixed 
effects; WGFE = worker-group fixed effects; WFE = individual worker fixed effects. All regressions include 
divestment period, year, and region effects (the latter pertain to establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  The 
FFE specification also includes gender, education, experience, and their interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  
The final column “WFE restricted” includes only those workers with at least two post-acquisition observations.  
** = significant at 0.01;  * = significant at 0.05.   
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 11:  Estimated FDI Effects on Hiring and Separation 
 
 FFE WGFE FFE WGFE 
Hiring 
    Foreign -0.000 -0.014 -0.000 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021) 
    Foreign*Wage --- --- 0.001 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
R
2
-within 0.060 0.003 0.063 0.007 
N (worker-years) 366,832 366,832 366,832 366,832 
Separation 
    Foreign 0.010 0.001 0.021 0.012 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.041) (0.048) 
    Foreign*Wage --- --- -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
R
2
-within 0.036 0.035 0.036 0.035 
N (worker-years) 185,575 185,575 185,575 185,575 
Notes:  These estimates are based on linear probability models, extensions of Equation 
(2) using the matched LEED sample for hiring and the matched LEED sample of linked 
workers for separations. The dependent variables in the two panels are a dummy for 
recent hire (in the previous calendar year) and a dummy for separation (in the next year), 
respectively.  Unconditional (weighted) means are 0.089 for hiring and 0.260 for 
separation.    FFE = firm fixed effects; WGFE = worker-group fixed effects; Foreign = 1 
if the firm is majority foreign owned in t-1.  All regressions include year, divestment 
period, and region effects (the latter pertain to establishments so are not collinear with 
FFE).  The FFE specification also includes gender, education, experience, and their 
interactions, as in column (2) of Table 5.  The separation regressions are weighted with 
the inverse of the probability of inclusion in the linked worker sample.  Standard errors 
(corrected for firm clustering) are shown in parentheses.    The first foreign year of each 
firm was dropped because of ambiguity on the timing of acquisition and hiring or 
separation in that year.  
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Table 12:  Estimated FDI Effects on Employment and Exit  
 
 Employment Firm Exit 
    Foreign -0.015 0.106 0.007 -0.007 
 (0.057) (0.052) (0.005) (0.008) 
    Foreign*Wage --- -0.016 --- 0.007** 
  (0.022)  (0.003) 
R
2
-within 0.261 0.276 0.017 0.027 
N (firm-years) 44,406 44,406 15,141 15,141 
Notes:  These estimates for the firm-level matched sample are based on an extension 
of Equation (1) where the dependent variable = ln(emp) and a dummy for exit from 
data (in the exit regressions firm fixed effects are not included).  The firm exit 
regression is a linear probability model excluding pre-acquisition years (both for 
treated and control firms), divestitures, and 2008.  The unconditional (weighted) mean 
exit rate is 0.019.  FFE(firm fixed effects) are included in the employment regression.  
All regressions include year, divestment period, and region effects (the latter pertain 
to establishments so are not collinear with FFE).  Standard errors (corrected for firm 
clustering) are shown in parentheses.  ** = significant at 0.01. 
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Table 13:  Estimated FDI Effects on Worker Composition 
 
 Female Elementary Vocational High school University Experience 
 -0.021** -0.004 -0.018* -0.023 0.045** -0.971** 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.299) 
R
2
 0.001 0.025 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.010 
Notes:  N = 395,053 worker-years.  Estimated coefficients on the foreign acquisition dummy from separate worker-
level regressions with listed individual characteristics as dependent variables; except for experience, which is in 
years, all are linear probability models.  Regressions include firm fixed effects, year, divestment period, and region 
effects.  ** = significant at 0.01.  * = significant at 0.05. 
 
 
39 
 
Table 14:  Estimated FDI Effects on Labor Productivity and 
Average Wage - Matched Firm-Level Sample 
 
 Average 
Wage 
Labor 
Productivity 
No controls for capital intensity 
and material cost/worker 
0.248** 0.261** 
(0.029) (0.064) 
R
2
-within 0.403 0.186 
Controls for capital intensity and 
material cost/worker 
0.199** 0.161** 
(0.028) (0.050) 
R
2
-within 0.493 0.512 
Note: Coefficients on Foreign from extensions of Equation (1) with average 
wage and labor productivity as dependent variables and, in the lower panel, 
controls for capital and material cost per worker.  Regressors in all 
specifications include firm fixed effects (FFE), year, divestment period, and 
region effects. N = 44,094 firm-years in the first specification and 43,081 firm-
years in the second.  Regressions are weighted by employment.  ** = significant 
at 0.01. 
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Table 15:  Estimated FDI Effects on Wages and 
Productivity by Source Country GDP, Acquisition 
Period, and Target Type – Matched Samples 
 
 Average 
Wage 
 Labor 
Productivity 
GDP per capita 0.033**  0.039* 
    (0.007)     (0.016) 
R
2
-within 0.344  0.148 
Early Acquisition 0.247**  0.257** 
(pre-1999) (0.037)  (0.088) 
Late Acquisition 0.251**  0.270* 
(post-1998) (0.091)  (0.129) 
R
2
-within 0.403  0.186 
State-Owned 0.310**  0.326** 
 (0.033)  (0.088) 
Domestic Private 0.104**  0.106* 
 (0.027)  (0.046) 
R
2
-within 0.411  0.189 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the ln(average wage) in the first 
specification and ln(labor productivity) in the 2nd specification.  All 
specifications include year, divestment period, region, and firm fixed 
effects (FFE).  GDP per capita measures the proportionate difference 
between the source country’s and Hungarian GDP per capita, relative to 
Hungarian GDP per capita, with all GDP values measured in 2000 US 
dollars (from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD).  
In the first panel, N = 26,675 firm-years; in the next two, N = 44,094 
firm-years; samples are identical for wage and productivity regressions.  
** = significant at 0.01. * = significant at 0.05. 
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Appendices19 
Appendix A:  Supplementary Tables 
 
Table A1:  Results of Propensity Score Estimation 
 
 Firm-Level Sample LEED 
 Mean Coefficient Mean Coefficient 
Log Average Wage 6.230 -0.258* 6.212 0.237 
  (0.119)  (0.281) 
(Log Average Wage)
2 
39.304 0.036** 39.198 0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.022) 
Log Employment 1.751 -0.043** 4.046 0.041 
  (0.017)  (0.078) 
(Log Employment)
2
 4.901 0.014** 17.813 0.008 
  (0.003)  (0.008) 
Wage Growth 0.171 -0.008 0.161 -0.033 
  (0.021)  (0.071) 
Employment Growth 0.046 0.075** 0.013 0.004 
  (0.021)  (0.056) 
Log Labor Productivity 8.813 -0.060 8.396 -0.027 
  (0.051)  (0.110) 
(Log Labor Productivity)
2
 79.198 0.004 72.177 0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Log Capital Intensity 6.771 -0.079** 6.707 -0.035 
  (0.024)  (0.066) 
(Log Capital Intensity)
2
 48.771 0.008** 47.362 0.005 
  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Pseudo R
2
 --- 0.136 --- 0.244 
Note:  Marginal effects from probit regressions.  The sample includes treated firms in the acquisition year 
and always domestic firms.  Dependent variable = 1 for foreign firms in the acqusition year.    All right-
hand side variables are from one year before the acquisition.  Wage Growth and Employment Growth = 
growth rates from two years before acquisition to one year before acquisition.  The regressions are pooled, 
and control firms are weighted so that their weighted number matches the number of treatments each year.  
Industry and year effects added.  N = 691,243 for the firm-level sample, 81,639 for the LEED.  ** = 
significant at 0.01; * = significant at 0.05. 
  
                                                 
19
 Appendix B, which contains a fuller description of the data, is available on request from the authors. 
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Table A2:  Balance of Covariates in the Matched Sample, 
One Year Before Acquisition  
 
 
Normalized Difference  
Treated - Controls  
 
Firm-Level 
Sample 
LEED 
Average Earnings 0.003 0.024 
Employment 0.019 0.006 
Wage Growth 0.025 -0.019 
Employment Growth 0.003 0.023 
Capital Intensity 0.013 0.005 
Labor Productivity 0.007 0.014 
Notes:  Difference in average values between treated and control firms, 
scaled by the square root of the sum of variances.  Mean of control 
observations subtracted from mean of treated observations.  Differences 
computed one year before acquisition.   
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Table A3: The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Working 
Hours – LEED, 1999-2008 
 
 FFE WGFE 
Full Sample   
   Acquisition Effect 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
   R
2
 0.296 0.290 
Matched Sample   
   Acquisition Effect -0.006 -0.017* 
    (0.009) (0.007) 
   R
2
 0.325 0.344 
Notes:  N = 999,550 for the full, and N = 169,010 for the matched sample.  
The dependent variable is the log of monthly paid hours. 
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Table A4: Wage Underreporting and Foreign Acquisition 
 
 FFE WGFE 
Matching 
with FFE 
Matching 
with WGFE 
Firm sample 
  
 
 
Interactions with Cheating 
Industry 
  
 
 
Acquisition 0.191** – 0.147** – 
 (0.035)  (0.046)  
Acquisition * Non- 0.112** – 0.116* – 
Cheating Industry (0.041)  (0.054)  
LEED sample 
  
 
 
Interactions with Cheating 
Industry 
  
 
 
Acquisition 0.132** 0.124** 0.087** 0.111** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) 
Acquisition * Non- 0.049 0.024 0.049 0.020 
Cheating Industry (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.037) 
Proportion of Workers at 
Minimum Wage 
    
Acquisition -0.067** -0.057** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) 
Notes:  In the top panels, the foreign acquisition dummy is interacted with a dummy variable that equals one for 
companies operating in two-digit industries with a low wage misreporting index computed by Elek et al. (2009).  
In the bottom panel, we run a linear probability regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for 
earnings less than 1.03 times the legal minimum wage.  FFE, WGFE and included covariates are the same as in 
Table 13.  N = 1,881,267 for the full firm sample, and N = 44,406 for the matched firm sample. N = 2,475,478 
for the full LEED sample, and N = 395,053 for the matched LEED sample. 
 
 
